Well, my review of ‘Voodoo Histories’ has appeared over at the Scoop Review of Books.
That is all.
Tag: Voodoo Histories
The Dentith Files – David Aaronovitch’s “Voodoo Histories” Review
Between 2008 and 2010, Matthew Dentith first joined 95bFM’s Simon Pound, then José Barbosa, on Sunday mornings to talk about conspiracy theories. Listen, as they say, again!
This week James and I discussed David Aaronvitch’s ‘Voodoo Histories,’ which lead into the discussion of the Protocols of the Elders of Zion (something I keep calling, when not corrected, the Elder Protocols of Zion; I wonder what the Younger Protocols of Zion are like?), the Trotsky Trials (which really are called the Moscow Trials since it was Trotsky supposed supporters who were tried at the time) and Aaronvitch’s dogmatic insistence that the Official Theory, the Received View or the Status Quo should be adhered to.
As I was washing my coffee cup James got a call from a fan who wanted to thank me for my review; the caller no longer feels the need to read the book after my scathing commentary. Given that reviews are either meant to persuade or dissuade someone from reading the book I think I’ve done my job.
Anyway, the written review will hopefully be posted shortly. More news, as I often say, as it comes to hand.
Voodoo Histories [Part 1]
I’m about to start reading David Aaronvitch’s ‘Voodoo Histories – The Role of the Conspiracy Theory in Shaping Modern History.’ It’s getting a lot of critical comment and I thought I might as well have a list of the various reviews to hand so that once I’ve read it I can engage in thoughtful head shaking or nodding as I reread the thoughts of others.
(I will also provide my own review; that’s why this is [Part 1]).
Frank Furedi’s review in the ‘Spiked Review of Books’
Robin Ramsay’s review at ‘Aaronvitch Watch’
There’s bound to be more out there, so let me know.
Actually, before I go, I do want to remark briefly on the Furedi review, because it contains the following paragraphs:
However, real existing conspiracies and officialdom’s occasional fabrication of conspiratorial stories should not be seen the foundation or premise of conspiracy theories. Unlike stories about plots to assassinate Princess Diana or Marilyn Monroe, a conspiracy theory is a theory because it doesn’t simply claim to provide explanations for a single event, but for much more than that. Most conspiratorial fantasies do not constitute a theory; a conspiracy theory is something quite different and distinct, and should be recognised as such.
A conspiracy theory provides a view of the world that both explains the background to events and, more importantly, provides a warning for the future. Its focus is not merely on behind-the-scenes machinations and plots against groups and individuals; instead it offers a comprehensive perspective that purports to reveal the real workings of the world we live in. The main theme of the conspiracy theory is the heinous act of moral subversion, allegedly carried out by a cabal of powerful people. In order to shed light on the importance of some global conspiracy, conspiracy theorists use the ideology of evil. This ideology offers a view of the world where unexpected occurrences and acts of misfortune are re-presented as the product of malevolent forces. In providing a comprehensive account of the threats that face a community, this ideology of evil seeks to give meaning to an otherwise incomprehensible world. Historically, the concept of evil has helped to explain why bad things happened; it provided an answer to society’s need to understand the cause of misfortune and it provided guidance on who should bear the blame for such misfortune.
Now, maybe I’m misreading this, but in the first paragraph he denies the role of explanation to Conspiracy Theories and yet in the second paragraph he provides a description as to how they provide an explanatory mechanism for Conspiracy Theorists. Indeed, his entire review is a little like that; he castigates people for mudding the waters about Conspiracy Theories (he especially castigates Mark Fenster) when they divide them up into warranted and unwarranted varieties, rather than sticking the notion of Conspiracy Theories as not just prima facie unwarranted but absolutely unwarranted beliefs.
Which is a pity, because part of his analysis, the focus on the ‘Inference to Conspiracy,’ is fairly close to my thesis, except that I think the Inference to Conspiracy is usually fallacious but not always ((Actually, I suspect Furedi thinks the ‘Inference to Conspiracy’ is sometimes warranted and would say that it is a different inference to the ‘Inference to a Conspiracy Theory.’ I’ll touch on that in the next few months.)).