Join Brian and Charles, in conversation with M on the history and pre-history of the philosophy of conspiracy theory, as well as how things have or have not changed since the pioneering work of the late 90s/early 2000s.

Abstract: I draw on Prior's 'The Runabout Inference Ticket' (a paper in Philosophical Logic) plus some of Dummett's remarks in Frege: the Philosophy of Language to argue that 'Conspiracy theory' and 'conspiracy theorist' are Tonkish terms with a variety of inconsistent introduction and elimination rules. The upshot is that 'conspiracy theory' and 'conspiracy theorist as they are commonly used do not generate determinate extensions. Whether or not something qualifies as a 'conspiracy theory' or somebody counts as a 'conspiracy theorist' depends upon who is talking and on which Tonkish rules they have chosen to deploy.

Abstract: Drawing on the relevant alternatives framework, I argue that the term "conspiracy theory" is typically used in ordinary language and public discourse to perform dismissive conversational exercitives, a special type of speech act whose function is to exclude certain elements from the set of alternatives considered relevant in a given conversational context. While performing dismissive conversational exercitives is not necessarily blameworthy, excluding alternatives that deserve to be taken seriously can be highly problematic for a variety of reasons. One of them is that the exclusion of relevant alternatives can give rise to what I call the "problem of premature knowledge claims".

Abstract: I aim to develop a conceptual framework for classifying generalist and particularist approaches to conspiracy theories (CT). Specifically, I exploit a probabilistic version of the square and hexagon of opposition which allows for visualising systematically the logical relations among basic philosophical positions concerning CTs. The probabilistic interpretation can also account for positions which make weaker claims about CTs: e.g., instead of claiming "every CT is suspicious" some theorists might prefer to claim "most CTs are suspicious" and then ask what contradicts such claims. Finally, I illustrate how the proposed framework can also be applied to other approaches to CTs, like psychological ones.

Join, Steve and Marius, in conversation with M, on the topic of whether, when we talk about the supposed problem of belief in conspiracy theories, we are talking about something which is wrong with conspriacy theories, or some issue to do with the kinds of people who believe such theories.

Abstract: Quassim Cassam maintains that Conspiracy Theories are primarily a form of political propaganda, and people who so much as "flirt with" them thereby support right-wing, racist and/or anti-Semitic ideologies - even if unwittingly. Thus, he recommends responding to them by "outing" them for their implicit right-wing racism/anti-Semitism, thereby embarrassing at least some conspiracy theorists into silence (primarily those with left-leaning sympathies). I maintain that his argument depends upon an untenable generalism about conspiracy theories. Consequently, his proposal itself amounts to advocacy of an inappropriate use of political propaganda and should be rejected. Each conspiracy theory ought rather to be treated according to its own particular epistemic merits.

Abstract: In this paper, I contend that the notion of the "conspiracy theorist" is a fundamentally relational concept that can never possess a stable definition. I borrow Thomas F. Gieryn's concept of boundary-work to suggest that the term "conspiracy theorist" is used pejoratively to protect prevailing hegemonic conceptions of what it means to be an intellectual. I conclude the paper by recommending that, if we wish to initiate a particularist turn in conspiracy theory research, we may need to invent an entirely new terminology to describe those people that we call "conspiracy theorists" and those objects that we call "conspiracy theories.""

Abstract: Michael Wood's 2016 paper, "Some Dare Call It Conspiracy: Labeling Something a Conspiracy Theory Does Not Reduce Belief in It", examines whether labelling something as a "conspiracy theory" acts as a stop when it comes to assessing claims which are conspiratorial. Wood concludes that some, indeed, dare call it "conspiracy", and thus the label "conspiracy theory" does not do shut down debate. We beg to differ. To bolster this argument, we present the results of a survey about the assassination of JFK, which shows that labelling something as a "conspiracy theory" has an effect on conversations about conspiracies.

Abstract: I contend that the requirement for investigating conspiracy theories is not contextless but predicated on epistemic duties and shared responsibilities within a particular social and discursive context. I argue that the generalist account fails because some epistemic locations might possess a low threshold for what warrants a conspiracy theory because of their social location. The standard particularist account also needs revision, however, because the shared epistemic responsibilities of certain social locations might entitle rational agents to ignore investigating some conspiracy theories. What emerges from this analysis is a contextual particularism that, via a centering of social location, is grounded in a revised form of the particularist's understanding of one's prima facie call to investigate conspiracy theories.

Abstract: In this presentation, I will analyze the conspiracy theory rhetoric of former British Prime Minister Tony Blair's speech to the Commons where he asserts his case for the invasion of Iraq. Specifically, I will be examining how Blair uses the rhetoric of a conspiracy theory to justify the Iraq War and how his reliance on the State’s ethos convinced the British public that Blair's justification itself was not a conspiracy theory. I assert that, through particularism, the State will use its ethos to conflate the official authorities with epistemic authorities.

Abstract: Justifying the coercive use of power by the state is one of the central tasks of social and political philosophy today. Deliberative theories of democracy claim that reason-exchange between free and equal citizens is central to the legitimacy of democracy. However, due to apparent moral and epistemic failures, conspiracy theories are viewed as a threat to democratic legitimacy. I challenge this assumption. I argue conspiracy theories have implicit social-epistemic requirements that commit the theorist to democratic norms and institutions.

Abstract: Conspiracy theories sprang up in response to public health measures to combat COVID-19. Many attempts have been made to persuade dissidents via education or incentives. Yet, they have met minimal success. Such efforts are ineffective, because they do not address the underlying disease, but rather attempt to treat one symptom. I reveal that these conspiracy theories can only be confronted, when they are recognized as a response to a larger societal problem. I employ Edmund Husserl's phenomenology to argue that the development of the sciences has led individuals to feel alienated, where this has set the conditions for the proliferation of conspiracy theories.

Abstract: Instead of considering what it means for a conspiracy theory (CT) to be about a conspiracy, I focus on the question of what it means for a CT to be a theory. I argue that there are three senses of 'theory' that correlate to different epistemic evaluations of CTs and show how these evaluations relate to the views of friends and critics of CTs. These insights illuminate some polarizing features of CT-disagreement that former philosophical responses have overlooked because of their focus on framing CT-disagreement in terms of the generalism/particularism distinction.

Abstract: Conspiracy theories do not have an excellent reputation today. This is due - I will argue in the talk - to the fact that the scientific study of conspiracy theories is governed by the generalist-repressivist research program ('GRP'). This program generally treats conspiracy theories as unjustified. After clarifying the concept of GRP, I will take a look at German research on conspiracy theories and use an observation by Tasmanian philosopher David Coady to argue against GRP.

Abstract: Discussions in contemporary epistemology are burdened with confusions about the terms "rational", "rationality", and their antonyms. In economics, for an agent to be rational simply means to satisfy the Bayesian probability axioms. Some philosophers get inspired by this tactic, but the situation is usually considered more complicated. Two kinds of rationality are often distinguished: epistemic and instrumental. This division cleared the way to rational irrationality, which is the case when an acceptance of epistemically unwarranted beliefs may increase instrumental profit for an individual. I will criticize this approach as unfruitful, using examples from philosophers who describe conspiracy theorists or conspiratorial thinking as rational.

Abstract: What, if anything, is wrong with conspiracy theories (CTs)? Many philosophers have concluded that the negative reputation of CTs is undeserved. In this paper, however, I argue that there is indeed something prima facie suspicious about CTs. My proposed demarcation criterion draws on a deep asymmetry between causes and effects in the world. I analyze CTs as the epistemological equivalent of black holes, in which unwary truth-seekers are drawn, never to escape. Finally, by presenting a generic "recipe" for generating novel CTs around any given event, I rescue the intuitions beneath phrases like "That's just a conspiracy theory."

Abstract: The simplest definition of 'conspiracy theories' leads us to conclude that we are all conspiracy theorists. Yet, I argue nobody would self-identify as such (the problem of self-identification). Since everyone emerge as conspiracy theorists, the construct is theoretically fruitless; like defining intelligence in a way that makes everyone intelligent (the problem for theoretical fruitfulness). These problems present us with a dilemma. I present an analysis of the solutions on offer, and argue that neither is satisfactory. Either a) the solution solves the problem of self- identification or b) provide a theoretical fruitful definition, but no account does both.

Abstract: M. Giulia Napolitano and Kevin Reuter ("What is a Conspiracy Theory?") have recently argued that the disagreement between Generalists and Particularists is best characterized as a set of dueling conceptual engineering projects. I argue that while they are right to turn to the conceptual engineering literature, their account of its applicability is misguided. Particularists and kindred earlier views are better read as aiming to diagnose the ways in which many discussions of the concept of conspiracy theories are a form of what I have recently called 'conceptual domination' in a paper of the same name.

Abstract: Although Particularism succeeded in dissipating the philosophical prejudice against conspiracy theories and in showing that they are not as such unwarranted, it has not been able to grasp their historical and political nature. Conspiracy theories often reproduce patterns and strategies which allow them to be mobilized for specific political purposes. Building on Patrick Stokes' criticism of pure Particularism, this paper sheds light on the political uses of conspiracy theories. More precisely, it follows Hofstadter's clue that in modernity they often reproduce apocalyptic narratives. Finally, it gives an account of the emergence of apocalypticism in our times and the kind of politics it entails.

Abstract: This paper conducts a critique of skepticism, an effort to determine "not what to do, or what must people believe but, rather, what evidence is there for beliefs, and is this evidence adequate?"" (Popkin), as it manifests itself in some strands of conspiracy theory research. It argues that a skeptical viewpoint forecloses an engagement with conspiracy theories beyond their empirical validity, thereby disregarding the many ways that conspiracy theories are meaningful despite their veracity. Borrowing from Immanuel Kant's 1st Critique, it contrasts skeptical reason with a transcendental approach to conspiracy theory research that identifies the ways that conspiracy theories circulate and are meaningful as discursive objects of experience.

Join Matthew, Melina and Will, in conversation with M, on how the next generation of scholars are responding to and developing the existing work in Philosophy on conspiracy theory.